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Resolving
the Western Power Crisis
In May 2000
electricity prices in the West rose dramatically, signaling
the start of what has been called the "California Energy
Crisis." Power Economics has played an important
role in the resolution of the crisis. There are many lessons
to be learned from this crisis. These lessons relate to:
- Power acquisition in re-structured markets
- Differential regulatory treatment of short- and long-term
power transactions
- System design
- The role of system design in gaming and market power
abuse
- Regulation of market power abuse
- Limitations of regulatory protection
- Importance of structural versus behavioral approaches
to mitigating market power
- Evidentiary requirements to demonstrate market power
abuse
- Business models
- The importance of a robust business model
- The frailty of certain merchant generators’ and marketers’
business models
- Factors contributing to investor confidence
- Contract modification
- The process and requirements for contract modification
before the FERC
- Managing throughout the crisis period
- The role of customers in averting and resolving power
crises
- The importance of creditworthiness
Power Economics actively worked with clients to help
resolve the crisis in a number of ways. Specific activities
that Power Economics undertook to help resolve the Western Power
Crisis include:
- Power Economics provided economic analysis, counsel
and testimony for the leadership of the California State
Assembly. Testimony provided for the Assembly encouraged
the FERC to expand the geographic and temporal scope of
its April 26, 2001 market mitigation order. In addition,
Power Economics provided testimony sponsored by the California
Assembly successfully challenging the Chief Administrative
Law Judge's initial recommendation of gas price assumptions
for use in calculating refunds. The FERC's recent change
in the gas price assumptions significantly increased the
refunds.
- Power Economics authored a white paper for the
Building Owners and Managers Association of California explaining
how commercial building owners could contribute to resolving
the crisis.
- In the San Diego Docket (EL00-95-045) the FERC has ordered
$3.3 billion in refunds for transactions coordinated through
the California Power Exchange and California Independent
System Operator. In that proceeding, Power Economics
successfully rebutted assertions by sellers' witnesses about
the appropriate method for calculating the prices that would
serve as the basis for refunds. Power Economics also
provided testimony in the refund case for the "California
Parties," a coalition that includes the California
Electricity Oversight Board, the California Attorney General,
the California Public Utilities Commission, Pacific Gas
& Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego
Gas & Electric.
- In the Puget Sound Energy case (EL01-10-00, -01) in which
refunds for spot market transactions in the Pacific Northwest
are being litigated, Power Economics testimony on
behalf of the California Parties provided evidence of market
power abuse and described the relationship of market manipulation
in California on the Pacific Northwest.
- For the City of Tacoma and the Port of Seattle, Power
Economics provided econometric evidence of the linkage
between markets in the Pacific Northwest and in California,
provided evidence of market power abuse and described the
nature of the unattainable regulatory burden imposed by
the Administrative Law Judge in the Puget hearings.
- The
FERC is now considering whether to modify long-term contracts
entered into during the crisis under section 206 of the
Federal Power Act. Power Economics has provided testimony
on this issue in proceedings for the California Electricity
Oversight Board, the California Public Utilities Commission,
the Snohomish County Public Utilities District, Southern
California Water Company, and PacifiCorp. The testimony
provided evidence on:
- Market
power abuse;
- Econometric
analysis of the relationship between spot and forward
prices;
- An
explanation of the FERC's misinterpretation of California
ratemaking when it adopted long-term contract benchmarks;
- A
method for adjusting the Commission's five-year-around-the-clock
benchmark to multiple products of varying duration;
- The
implications of contract modification on investor confidence.
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